{"id":314,"date":"2002-11-05T10:15:08","date_gmt":"2002-11-05T09:15:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/2002\/11\/on_the_role_of\/"},"modified":"2022-11-17T15:03:47","modified_gmt":"2022-11-17T14:03:47","slug":"on_the_role_of","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/2002\/11\/on_the_role_of\/","title":{"rendered":"On the role of trust in knowledge management"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><P>In my recent <A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-bin\/item.cgi?id=92181\">article on the<br \/>\nrole of trust in knowledge management<\/A>, I discussed trust as an action.<br \/>\nSomething I do to jump over uncertainties in decisions or choices I have to<br \/>\nmake. In <A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-bin\/item.cgi?id=86659\">another thread on<br \/>\nthe same topic<\/A>, <A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-site\/whoswho.cgi?action=detail&amp;authorid=563458&amp;id=44063\">Gary<br \/>\nLawrence Murphy<\/A> plays devil&#8217;s advocate and challenges this view of trust as<br \/>\nan action, as a verb. I begged to disagree with him and then I said something<br \/>\nthat already sounded odd when I wrote it, and that my thoughts kept returning to<br \/>\nsince: <BR><I>It is my action, it is me that willingly ignores the uncertainty<br \/>\nand moves ahead. Trust is what I need to make a choice\/decision and carry it<br \/>\nout. Trust is not a commodity that resides in the one I am trusting. <B>If I<br \/>\ntrust someone to be responsive to me,it actually means to me that I need LESS<br \/>\ntrust to be able to reach a decision, whether to engage with this person or<br \/>\nnot<\/B>. By showing trust, i.e. jumping over uncertainties, I build<br \/>\nrelationships with other people. The result of these actions is a trusting<br \/>\nrelationship, where the trust invested by me (and not the initial<br \/>\ntrustworthiness of the other: again, it is not a commodity) leads to less<br \/>\nuncertainties (for me) in the next choices\/decisions I may have to make in that<br \/>\nrelationship. <\/I><BR>I have made the part I found odd bold. What was I saying<br \/>\nhere: if I trust someone I need less trust? This morning under the shower I came<br \/>\nup with this tentative explanation: I have defined trust as an action. By<br \/>\njumping over my uncertainties on the outcome of a decision I come to the<br \/>\ndecision. I <I>trust<\/I> my decision to work out ok.<BR>If this decision<br \/>\nconcerns a relationships with someone else, and if my decision works out, we<br \/>\nnormally say that this means the other can be trusted. However based on my<br \/>\ndefinition the trust was in making the decision. The fact that it worked out<br \/>\nactually gave me proof that next time for the same decision, the uncertainties<br \/>\nmight be less. And therefore my leap of faith might be smaller to come to the<br \/>\nsame decision again. <BR>So if we say we trust someone, this means that we<br \/>\nrecognize a consistent pattern of behaviour, and a certain level of<br \/>\npredictability (reputation) in the other which is strong enough to reduce the<br \/>\nuncertainties I may have in making choices\/decisions with the other as<br \/>\ncounterpart. So I need to excersize less trust, because I can trust the other<br \/>\nbased on his track-record. Then a trusting relationship is not a relationship<br \/>\nwhere the actions of both counterparts require high levels of trust (as an<br \/>\naction) but a place where there is proof of these high levels in the past,<br \/>\nactually resulting in less need of trust as an action in the here and now.<br \/>\n<BR>Of course this will need frequent enough positive feedback, reaffirmation.<br \/>\nThis because we deal with estimates of uncertainties. If I betray a trusting<br \/>\nrelationship, what I actually do is saying to the other that the his\/her<br \/>\nuncertainty estimate based on my reputation is a miscalculation. Then the other<br \/>\nhas to trust enormously to be able to reinvest in a relationship: what he\/she<br \/>\nthought was a reliable certainty turned out to be a huge uncertainty. It is when<br \/>\nthis newly required leap of faith is too big that a relationship is abruptly<br \/>\nterminated.<br \/>\n<P>Of course Gary responded to the above in kind, see <A href=\"http:\/\/www.teledyn.com\/mt\/archives\/000271.html\">his blog entry<\/A> at<br \/>\nTeledyn where he wonders how it is that none of us over on knowledgeboard met<br \/>\nhis challenge head-on, even though there are enough metrics to warrant such a<br \/>\ndiscussion. Why is it that were only attempts to either prove him wrong, as I<br \/>\ntried to do, or to just look away and avoid the whole issue of how trust is not<br \/>\njust a cognitive thing but a physical sensation as well? <BR>The reason that non<br \/>\nof us have reacted to Gary&#8217;s neuro-physiological approach, now that I think<br \/>\nabout it, might stem from an intuitive (neurophysiological?) drive to block out<br \/>\nanything that points to our more animal-like aspects. And pavlovian responses to<br \/>\nother peoples e.g. subliminal messages is something we probably don&#8217;t want to<br \/>\ndwell on for long as it seems to undermine our basic perception of ourselves as<br \/>\nfree agents. Or maybe it is just because we are generally ill at ease with the<br \/>\nintangible stuff that goes on in our heads. Maybe this would be something to<br \/>\nexplore further. Also, and this is something very different, I see a two-way<br \/>\napproach in responding to what has been said in the threads on trust sofar. One<br \/>\ngroup of comments takes the self as a starting point and then reflects on what I<br \/>\ncan do to enter into trusting relationships. This is also the point of reference<br \/>\nI take. (although I&#8217;m pretty much the only one probably that takes trust as<br \/>\nsomething that&#8217;s independent from intrapersonal relationships). The other group<br \/>\ntakes the other as a starting point and then asks how can I be sure that he&#8217;s<br \/>\nnot doublecrossing me, in other words how can I protect myself from<br \/>\nuntrustworthy elements. This to me seems the basic divide: how can I foster<br \/>\ntrust, vs\/and how can I defend myself against misplacing trust. The first starts<br \/>\nof from a generally trusting view of the world, the other from a generally<br \/>\ndistrusting view of the world. Thinking along while writing this, I have the<br \/>\nintuitive feeling that this division might be the reason I responded to Gary&#8217;s<br \/>\noriginal comment with an attempt to persuade him to my view, or in other words<br \/>\nto prove him wrong. If that&#8217;s the case, than it&#8217;s of course no wonder that it<br \/>\ndidn&#8217;t work \ud83d\ude42 Thus far the articles from both <A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-bin\/item.cgi?id=86659\">John Moore<\/A>,<br \/>\n<A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-bin\/item.cgi?id=94963\">George Por<\/A><br \/>\nand <A href=\"http:\/\/www.knowledgeboard.com\/cgi-bin\/item.cgi?id=92181\">myself<\/A><br \/>\nhave concentrated on the question how to foster trust, as a person or a<br \/>\norganisation. Anything on how to deal with willful distrustful behaviour by<br \/>\nothers has been left untouched. In my article, with hindsight, this was done on<br \/>\npurpose, as I tried to explore what I can do pro-actively. The distrustful view<br \/>\nof the world takes a more reactive stance, as it seems to me, and that is<br \/>\nsomething I generally try to avoid, as it puts me on the receiving end of any<br \/>\npotential stick almost automatically.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In my recent article on the role of trust in knowledge management, I discussed trust as an action. Something I do to jump over uncertainties in decisions or choices I have to make. In another thread on the same topic, Gary Lawrence Murphy plays devil&#8217;s advocate and challenges this view of trust as an action, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"webmentions_disabled_pings":false,"webmentions_disabled":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[85],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-314","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","category-knowledge-management","h-entry","hentry"],"archive_meta":{"categories":["knowledge work"],"tags":[],"page_categories":[],"format":null,"kind":null,"ref":null},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/314","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=314"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/314\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":977,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/314\/revisions\/977"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=314"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=314"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.zylstra.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=314"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}